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Abstract
This article sketches my personal impression of the changes that have occurred over the
last decade in the Israeli checkpoints in and around Jerusalem. These changes have
manifested both in the physical design of the checkpoints and in their human man-
agement. I discuss these changes through focusing on the women’s human rights
organization ‘MachsomWatch’. The role of this organization, I claim here, has changed
in ways that parallel the solidification and the bureaucratization of the border. Espe-
cially noticeable is the shift in the location of resistance and its characterization, from a
direct confrontation model that occurs at the physical space of the border to a focus
on legal actions and administrative strategies, performed in distant and at times even
virtual locations. Alongside this process, MachsomWatch women – avid protestors of
Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian West Bank – have, despite themselves, become a
routine feature of Israel’s occupational apparatus. This essay’s grounded ethnographic
account provides a vivid illustration of the ways in which resistance feeds from and into
power.
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Maybe it doesn’t sound so bad, but it’s terrible. It was much easier when we were standing
there and we were talking to the soldier and the soldier could make a decision, even if it was
nasty. There was some give and take. Now there is no more give and take. It’s all bureau-
cracy, and no one knows it. It’s not like you get a little booklet and they tell you – ‘hey, those
are the rules’. The rules change from day to day. This is the way to keep the Palestinians
under severe control . . . I know that other countries have borders. But not like this. These
are borders to keep people apart, to not let them see each other, to not talk to each other.
(Hanna Barag, interview)
June 3, 2011: Qalandia Crossing
I forgot how frustrating it is to be a Jewish Israeli on the Israeli/Palestinian border. It
doesn’t matter that I am an academic, that I am only observing, that I can’t really help.
Just being there, clearly a non-Palestinian in this ethnically bifurcated space, is enough to
attract the attention of those who are desperate for any help. ‘Please, Madam’, an elderly
Palestinian in a wheelchair approaches me. ‘I have an appointment at a hospital in East
Jerusalem and there’s no one in the humanitarian lane’. While he scrambles to show me
his papers, a young man approaches me, asking politely in Oxford English if I would
please escort him. He leads me to the long line that stretches in front of the only open
Figure 1. Women standing in queue at the Qalandia Crossing, June 3, 2011. Photo by author.
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turnstile. Somewhere in the middle of it all, a young woman holds a sleeping infant cov-
ered in pink blankets. ‘Is she okay?’ I ask, concerned about the blankets in what is, already
at 7:00 am, a hot summer’s day. Her husband explains that the baby is sick and that they are
trying to get her to the hospital in East Jerusalem. Although they have permits, they have
been waiting for over an hour already. ‘She’s only two weeks old’, the husband exclaims
sadly, looking around him as if to say, ‘and look what kind of life we have brought her
into’.
Ten minutes later, and I have already shed my academic stance of non-involvement. I
find myself scrambling between the Palestinian queues and the Israeli soldiers, translating,
negotiating, begging even. I somehow manage to persuade the Israeli soldiers to open the
humanitarian lane. The man in the wheelchair is first to move through. He still has a few
obstacles before him, I think to myself. But in the space of the checkpoint, moving is
always better than not moving. Next, I pull the woman and her infant out of the regular
lane and lead them into the (now open) humanitarian lane. She passes through, but her hus-
band is not allowed to join them. He stays with the stroller in the regular lane. ‘He’s strong
enough, he’ll survive’, Hanna Barag of MachsomWatch tells me dryly.
Hanna lives in one of West Jerusalem’s long-established neighborhoods, the German Col-
ony. She has been leaving the comforts of her home to monitor the checkpoints on the Israeli/
Palestinian border for almost 10 years now. Although Hanna is over 70 years old and has
Figure 2. Palestinian in wheelchair approaching the closed humanitarian lane, Qalandia, June 3,
2011. Photo by author.
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serious ankle problems as well as her own set of children and grandchildren to take care of, she
goes out to the checkpoints on a weekly, sometimes even daily, basis. Through the years, I’ve
encountered her there at any time between 4:00 am and nighttime, weekdays and weekends.
As I travel with Hanna in her car and listen to her conversations on speakerphone, I can clearly
hear the respect in the voices of Israeli commanders and Palestinians alike. The commanders
call her to find out what she thinks about the latest changes they have introduced to the design
of one checkpoint or about their improved performance in another. Palestinians call to see if
she can help them obtain the much-desired magnetic card1 or a permit to enter Israel. Both
Israelis and Palestinians fear this small but fierce German lady with white hair.
Hanna is not alone in the struggle to bear witness at the border. The organization
MachsomWatch (Machsom is Hebrew for checkpoint) was started in 2001 by five elderly
Jerusalemite women (MachsomWatch, 2001). Today, it is one of the larger community-
based, human rights nonprofits in Israel, encompassing over 400 women from across the
country. I joined MachsomWatch in 2002. Since I left Israel for North America in 2004, I
have returned periodically to observe the border, this time in an academic capacity.
Elsewhere, I have situated the changes that have taken place at the Israeli/Palestinian
border within the prevailing literature on borders (Braverman, 2011). There, I contend
that border regimes are historical and geographical contingencies in terms of logic and
operation. In particular, I claim that if the EU and the US–Mexico borders are becoming
leakier and more mobile in terms of their operation, the Israel–West Bank case is clearly
not following this trend, at least not exclusively so. While some aspects of this border are
indeed fluid and capricious, it is at the same time becoming more fixed, more territorial,
more bureaucratic, and more infrastructural. My emphasis was a direct response to Joe
Heyman’s call to create a reflective and critical literature on bureaucracies in unequal
societies (Heyman, 1995: 285).
Also in response to Heyman, this essay moves away from conceptualizing the bor-
der to provide a personal account and a set of reflections on the very same changes
that I have previously depicted through a conceptual lens. My discussion of the
changes in the physical design of the checkpoints and in their human management
is filtered here through a focus on MachsomWatch. The role of this organization, I
argue, has changed alongside the solidification and the bureaucratization of the bor-
der. Through protesting the occupation in a structured, consistent, and increasingly
legal manner, MachsomWatch has turned into an almost routine element of the occu-
pation. This grounded account provides an acute example of how resistance feeds into
hegemony.
Methodologically, this essay draws on 12 in-depth, semi-structured interviews con-
ducted in the summer and fall of 2008, in the summer of 2011, and in the winter of
2012, with former and present high-level officials and with women activists of Mach-
somWatch. It also relies on my own observations as a former member of Machsom-
Watch, which I conducted on a weekly basis between 2002 and 2004, along with
participatory observations in the summers of 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2011 at the check-
points Qalandia/Atarot (Arabic/Hebrew), Bethlehem/Rachel, and Abu-Dis/Zeitim.
Finally, this essay draws on the rich online reports posted by MachsomWatch as well
as other human rights organizations and governmental offices. Together, the inter-
views, observations, and online materials offer an ‘insider ethnography’ (Gupta and
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Ferguson, 1997: 31) that reveals some of the concrete implications of the spatial and
administrative modernization of the crossings. As far as I know, the recording of Israel’s
acclaimed process of modernization from the personalized perspectives of both high mil-
itary officials and human rights activists has not been used in other studies of the Israel–
West Bank border (see e.g. Abu-Zahra, 2007; Gordon, 2008; Handel, 2007; Weizman,
2007; but see Kelly (2006, 2008) for a similar ethnographic approach in the West Bank,
and Heyman (1995), who uses this approach in the context of the US–Mexico border).
Bethlehem – El Hader – Abu Dis: 2002–2004
I vividly remember the first time I monitored a checkpoint on the Israeli/Palestinian bor-
der. It was at the Bethlehem checkpoint, just south of Jerusalem, in 2002. I recall being
very upset when witnessing an Israeli soldier detaining two attractive Palestinian female
students who were trying to make their way from Bethlehem to their university inside
Jerusalem. This detainment was clearly not performed for security reasons. I also
remember observing how, every time the soldier would turn his back, a few of the Pales-
tinians who hid behind the monastery across the road would run through the open fields
that stretched out ahead, bypassing the necessities of permits and identification. I
remember how problematically arbitrary both events seemed to be.
Later that year, I started regularly monitoring the El Hader checkpoint. This check-
point was situated several miles into the occupied territories, in between the village of
El Hader and the highway that connects Jerusalem and Hebron. At times, my Jerusale-
mite partner in MachsomWatch and I would find the Israeli soldiers there, standing on a
pile of dirt and monitoring the movement of Palestinians in and out of their village
(Figure 3). Those who were sufficiently fit to avoid the soldiers by walking around the
village and through the olive groves usually did so, although sometimes they were caught
too. The women, children and elderly were usually confined to the dirt path where the
soldiers awaited. At times, we would get to El Hader and it would be a dirt road just like
any other dirt road. At other times, we would get there to see the soldiers standing on the
pile of dirt, with a long line of Palestinians stretching out on both sides. An improvised
market with fruits and vegetables, coffee and sahlab,2 would then spontaneously appear
to serve those who might be hungry or thirsty from the extended journey back home.
One day, as I was negotiating with the soldiers about the terms that would enable a
pregnant Palestinian woman to pass the checkpoint despite the just-announced closure,
I was suddenly alarmed to hear the noise of hand grenades falling nearby. I felt a strong
burning sensation in my nostrils and throat. I started running away in the other direction,
along with the Palestinians who had previously been standing in line. To complicate mat-
ters, we were all running back toward their village, which was formally defined by the
Oslo Accords as Area ‘A’ and therefore prohibited entry for Israelis. I was trapped: if I
ran to the village I would be breaking the law, yet running toward the shooting soldiers
did not seem all that safe either. I suddenly realized that the pregnant woman was not
among us. I can no longer remember how I returned to Israel or whether I ever found
out the fate of that woman. What has stayed with me was how surprised I was to expe-
rience through my own body the extreme capriciousness of the Israeli soldiers’ behavior.
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Finally, between 2002 and 2004, I frequently visited the village of Abu Dis in East Jer-
usalem. A set of low blockades and concrete walls that cut through the heart of this village
served as a reminder that the Green Line divides this Jerusalemite village into two different
zones. At the time, children were climbing through gaps in the walls, throwing their large
backpacks to the other side and then jumping over. Of course, none of this happened when
soldiers appeared to enforce the separation regime.
My notes from these three sites – Bethlehem, El Hader, and Abu Dis – explain the work-
ings of the ‘old-style’ checkpoints. At the time, the checkpoints were situated in open space,
where they were means of blocking movement. Palestinians were then frequently able to
work around the checkpoints; many crossed illegally to get to work on the Israeli side, some-
times on a daily basis. In the old days, the situation was transient and ad hoc: one moment a
soldier’s word was the official order of the place, only to be replaced by a contradictory order
the next moment. There was no written set of instructions, at least not one that was visible to
Palestinians. Signs were a rare occurrence. This situation placed more discretion in the hands
of individual soldiers, which resulted in instances of arbitrary enforcement, on the one hand,
and positive adjustments, on the other hand. In other words, alongside the arbitrariness of
Israel’s operation of these checkpoints, there were usually real faces to negotiate with and
a one-on-one encounter between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians.
Then came the Separation Barrier.
Figure 3. On the dirt pile. Old-style checkpoint in El Hader, south of Jerusalem. Photo by author,
July 2004.
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‘The Fence that Makes the Difference’:3 2004
In June 2002, the government of Israel decided to erect a physical barrier to separate Israel
from the West Bank. According to Israel, the fence was intended to limit ‘the ability of
terrorist organizations to enter Israel and present operational obstacles . . . making it dif-
ficult for them to carry out suicide bombing attacks within Israel’.5 In most areas along its
723 kilometer-long route, the barrier comprises an electronic fence with dirt paths, barbed-
wire fences and trenches on both sides. Its average width is 60 meters. In some areas, an
eight-meter-high wall has been erected instead of the barrier system. In September 2011,
62 percent of the barrier was completed, with 80 percent of the barrier route built inside the
West Bank, seriously limiting access to areas behind the barrier (OCHA, 2011).
The terminology used for describing the barrier is already an indication of one’s polit-
ical stance. Whereas the term ‘the Wall’ (with a capital ‘W’) is frequently used by those
who oppose the construction, the term ‘fence’ is often used by Israeli officials to
marginalize its effects on the landscape and to illustrate its transient nature. The Separa-
tion Barrier – the term I use here to refer to the combination of the Wall and the elec-
tronic fence – was built to replace the previous situation whereby hundreds of
checkpoints, mostly transient (or, in the Israeli military jargon, ‘flying’, see Handel,
2007) were scattered through numerous roads and paths, not only those leading into
Israel but also those within the occupied territories themselves (Tirza, interview). Con-
versely, the focus of the new border regime is on the borderline between Israel and the
occupied West Bank. The military officials interviewed here have argued, accordingly,
that under the new regime the total number of checkpoints and roadblocks has been
reduced and that this goes to demonstrate Israel’s improved humanitarian attitude toward
Palestinians (Paz and Tirza, interviews).6
As already mentioned, several years prior to the construction of the Separation Barrier
in Jerusalem, low concrete blockades and roadblocks were prominent in certain areas.
Figure 4. ‘Saving Lives’. Faces of terror victims, image from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
website4
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This ad hoc border was ‘passable’, in the sense that Palestinians soon found routes
around, under, and over it, as clearly shown in Figure 5 of Abu Dis in 2002 (left). When
I visited the village of Abu-Dis in north-east Jerusalem six years later, in the summer of
2008, I encountered a different scene altogether. The semi-structured border had turned
into an eight-meter-high Wall (Figure 5, right). The numerous improvised crossings had
vanished from the border’s landscape, replaced by large crossings situated at significant
distances from one another. In effect, the people of Abu-Dis, some of whom are Jerusa-
lem residents, must now travel many miles – and through a border crossing – to reach
what was once the other side of the street.
Under the new border regime, working around the Wall or Barrier is physically much
more taxing: one can either dig below it or fly above it, the latter being almost impos-
sible. The Wall’s slow but steady construction has thus gradually transformed the nature
of the checkpoints, making the structure and management of the official crossings all the
more important. In effect, the crossings have become potential – yet obligatory – points
of passage. Under the new regime, the border crossings are the central node of Israel’s
bureaucracy of occupation. This, despite the fact that according to official numbers, no
more than 60,000 Palestinians – less than 3 percent of the West Bank population – have
been granted permits to pass through the new crossings to work in Israel.7
Israel’s New Border Crossings: 2004–2011
I see the passages as regular international passages. We try to make it so that the passage
will be quick and swift, without any unnecessary interactions. (Interview, Micha, Head
of Administration and Funding, Crossing Directorate)
Figure 5. The same street in Abu Dis, before (on left) and after (on right) the Wall. Photo on left
by Neta Efroni, February 15, 2002; photo on right by Rachel Naparstek, May 4, 2005. Both
courtesy of MachsomWatch.
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After being away for almost two years, my first encounter with the Separation Barrier and
its effects was jarring. I recall that I was first struck by the abundance of signs. Indeed, at
the new border crossings, a multitude of signs await Palestinians at every corner and curve,
visibly instructing them how to conduct themselves in what is yet another manifestation of
Israel’s show of permanence.
Another shift that occurred during my years away was in the linguistics of the occu-
pation. Instead of what were formerly identified as ‘checkpoints’, the Israeli vocabulary
now emphasizes the terms ‘border crossings’, ‘passages’, and, yet more recently, ‘inter-
national terminals’. But the shift has not merely been one of vocabulary. It is a shift in the
governing philosophy applied at the Israeli–West Bank border: from a military to a
consumer-based approach, and from old style checkpoints to new and modernized border
crossings, administered through a rationalized bureaucracy. If before, the checkpoint
represented an uncertain and transient place, operated at the whims of ad hoc, low-
level soldiers and policemen, it is now being transformed, so Israel’s official claim goes,
into a permanent physical construction, regulated by and operated through automated
devices and professional officers. Israel’s old-time occupation, Israel’s narrative contin-
ues, with its narrow focus on security and its aggressive on-the-ground manifestations,
has been replaced by an efficient regulatory system that fosters an open and cooperative
relationship with Palestinians.
Figure 6. Palestinian bus in front of Israel’s border signs on the Palestinian side of Qalandia
Crossing, June 3, 2011. Photo by author.
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Since 2004, the numerous internal checkpoints scattered across the West Bank
are arguably supplanted by fewer but more permanent crossings. The Israeli human
rights organization B’Tselem reports that at the end of 2011, there were 91 check-
points inside the West Bank, 66 of which were permanent and regularly staffed and
the remaining 25 had infrastructure in place but were staffed sporadically.8 In addi-
tion, nine checkpoints are located on the Green Line: these are the last inspection
points before entering Israel (and referred to by Israeli officials as terminals rather
than checkpoints). Finally, along the Separation Barrier there were 66 agricultural
gates that enable limited Palestinian access to their agricultural land west of the Bar-
rier. Twelve of the gates were opened daily for a few hours, the others were opened
only during certain agricultural seasons.9 Some of the checkpoints were completely
or partially privatized, and several were staffed by armed civilian guards employed
by private security companies under supervision of the Crossing Directorate of the
Ministry of Defense (Ministry of Defense, 2003; see also Maoz, n.d.).
The change is not simply in the appearance of the checkpoint and its accompany-
ing terminology. It is also a deep structural change in the bureaucratic operations of
this space – a transformation in the organizational entities that occupy the check-
points. Indeed, Israel has recently moved from employing military personnel to
deploying security guards hired by private companies. This, government officials
stress, is part of a progressive effort to professionalize border operations and make
them more efficient. It also turns the border into a more humane place, these offi-
cials argue. In other borders around the world, the same process is often referred to
as ‘privatization’. This, however, is not the case here. The term used by Israeli offi-
cials to indicate the shift in the human management of the border is ‘civilization’
(izruach); that is, the use of civilians (rather than soldiers) to work (rather than
serve) in the checkpoints.
Privatizing the Crossings
That is one of the problems: who is responsible? ... There are five companies: the military
police, the border police, the DCO, the blue police, and the private companies. So you can
imagine what goes on here. Who takes what responsibility? Who makes the decisions? Who
has the power? (Barag, interview, June 3, 2011)
In 2003, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) inaugurated the program ‘Another Life’.
The aim of this program was to ‘minimize the damage to Palestinian life fabric (mir-
kam haim) in order to avoid a humanitarian crisis that would necessitate the IDF to
provide food and services to the Palestinian population’ (Weizman, 2007: 290,
n.36). Baruch Spiegel, a graduate of an MBA program who had previously con-
vinced the IDF to employ a new management strategy in Gaza – was then appointed
as IDF Director of Civilian and Humanitarian Issues (Weizman, 2007: 143).
According to a plan that Spiegel devised, 12 permanent closure checkpoints were
built along the length of the newly constructed Separation Barrier. As with Israel’s other
international terminals, they were to be operated by Israel’s Airport Authority: Reshet.
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However, the first implementation stage rendered Reshet’s management of the crossing
impractical ‘because of the scale ... when the Gaza Strip was open for entry into Israel
many more people crossed it in a day than they cross Ben Gurion Airport, and I’m talking
about one crossing only ... So, Reshet couldn’t carry this [forth]’ (Paz, interview).
The task at hand, then, was to create an alternative administration that would take on
the role of managing the new crossings. Eventually, the Ministry of Defense – a govern-
mental entity with security as its top interest – was chosen to oversee the management of
the new border, while the on-the-ground work was to be conducted by private compa-
nies. In 2004, a separate body was created within the Ministry of Defense to manage this
new apparatus. It was named Minhelet Ha’Maavarim, or the Crossing Directorate (Trei-
ber, interview).
Shaul Mofaz, then Minister of Defense, appointed Bezalel Treiber to serve as head of
the new administration.10 As former head of the Minister of Defense’s cabinet and for-
mer Deputy Chief for Israel’s Airport Authority, Treiber embodied the two overarching
agendas of the new border: security, on the one hand, and consumer orientation, on the
other hand. The ‘civilization’ (in Hebrew izruach, literally ‘making civil’) of the cross-
ings is an on-going process, Treiber tells me, and is taking much longer than originally
expected.
Qalandia crossing, which connects Jerusalem with Ramallah, was the first to be ‘civi-
lized’ at the end of 2005. Treiber further informs me that at the time of the interview, 11
of 40 passages have been civilized.11 Because of their sensitive status, he says, Israeli
border police continue to manage the Jerusalem passages, with assistance from private
guards and Israeli soldiers.
The reason for demilitarizing and then outsourcing the crossings was mostly prag-
matic: the IDF was needed for other missions, the daily border operations had a negative
effect on the IDF’s reputation, and a professional workforce was deemed to be more
effective in this situation (Arieli, interview). Yet Treiber strongly maintains that civiliz-
ing the crossings is worlds apart from privatizing them. In his words:
[T]his is absolutely not a process of privatization. The entire passage is under government
responsibility from beginning to end. Indeed, the people who are doing the work are from a
private company . . . but we manage their job. This is completely not privatization, it’s as
far from it as east is from west. This is not a soldier’s job in any part of the world.
(Interview)
Treiber’s explanation stresses the importance of normalization and professionaliza-
tion at the border, as he attempts to draw comparisons with other international bor-
der sites. This line of reasoning is also supported by various other governmental
narratives. For example, Israel’s Ombudsman Reports of 2003 and 2005 state the
urgency of professionalizing the crossings and outsourcing them from military hands
(Tal, 2006). The spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense similarly declares that
‘the civilization of the checkpoints is a humanitarian action’ (Ministry of Defense
Press Release, 2006). Another government statement by Israel notes along these
lines that: ‘[T]o lessen the existing friction in the security checks, humanize the pro-
cess, and improve standards of service, security will be privatized and civilians
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rather than soldiers will conduct all security checks’ (Ministry of Defense Press
Release, 2006).
Who, then, is in charge at a particular place and time? According to Treiber, the hier-
archy is clear: while those who do the on-the-ground work are civilians, the Crossing
Directorate he leads is always in charge. The same is true with regard to the soldiers
or police who operate the crossings, he says, whose authority is greater than that of pri-
vate security guards. But while it might be crystal clear to Treiber, this situation has been
a source of immense confusion for Palestinians. Whereas in the past, Palestinians may
have been able to identify the officer who issued commands, now such identification
is almost impossible. This perhaps unintended but nonetheless useful uncertainty at
Israel’s new border reinforces Israel’s overall bureaucracy of occupation (Braverman,
2011; Handel, 2007).
In light of the intended transformation of the Israel–West Bank border from a military
to a civilian regime, one would expect that the civilian aspects of this border manage-
ment would be highlighted and made immediately apparent. Instead, the new private
guards are dressed like soldiers. To the untrained eye, this seems like an extension of the
old border regime. So, while Israel goes out of its way to create an impression of newness
and to let the world know that through civilization, it is now aligning itself with other
nations, it does not bother to make this transformation more readily visible to anyone
who actually visits this space.
How to explain this discrepancy? The answer lies in the multitude of presentations
that occur at the border and, more importantly, in the multitude of audiences that these
presentations are intended for. One presentation is meant for the Israeli and international
public eye. On this front, the border’s re-design is made to seem significant and transfor-
mative. The Palestinians, on the other hand, rarely get to see this new face-lift, and are
instead confronted with the confusion of the border’s increasing bureaucratization.
At the Qalandia checkpoint, this sort of dissonance between performances is every-
where: the outside signs welcoming the passengers and wishing them good health are
surrounded by heaps of trash and debris; the inside signs blinking ‘have a pleasant stay’,
are obscured by thick layers of bars and fences; and the 12 new booths installed to serve
passengers, of which only four are regularly operative. The general design of the place
thus sends conflicting messages: you are a customer and, as such, we are here to serve
you better, but you are at the same time also dangerous and, remember, you also live
under an occupation regime that strictly controls your every move.
Similarly, Israel’s official brochures as well as its official website speak about a
consumer model that includes considerations of the local mirkam haim (fabric of
life). On the other hand, a virtual tour of recent images, videos, and reports pre-
sented on MachsomWatch’s website depicts Palestinians standing in line for hours,
climbing over each other to get to the Israeli side, and subjected to overwhelming
and confusing instructions.12 Furthermore, these human rights websites do not dis-
tinguish between Israel’s old and new crossings. Have they neglected to notice the
transformation in Israel’s border regime? MachsomWatch activists interviewed here
are not only skeptical about this transformation, they are also pessimistic: they per-
ceive the new regime not only as an extension of the old but, even more so, as
enabling a more sophisticated mode of occupation altogether. In the name of
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improved service and humaneness, they say, Israel’s new border actually secures a
tighter form of control.
Bureaucratization and the Legalization of Resistance
Today, there aren’t really any checkpoints like there used to be, where we could stand for
hours, for an entire day even, and document the atrocities of the occupation. Nowadays, the
women go from passage to passage and from there to the agricultural gates. We are usually
prohibited from entering inside the passages. As for the gates, some of them are open for an
hour, three times a day. We know these hours, and so we travel from one gate to another.
You will no longer see an Israeli soldier beating up a Palestinian; this older form of control
was replaced by incredibly complicated routines. Now, there isn’t really much we can do,
just to document. (Rash, interview)
A detailed example of how the ‘new’ bureaucracy of occupation actually works is pro-
vided in MachsomWatch’s report Invisible Prisoners from November 2011. The report
begins with a scene from Franz Kafka’s The Castle, which details the struggles of the
protagonist K. to gain access to the mysterious authorities of a castle who govern the vil-
lage for unknown reasons. The reports says:
This is the story of K., but it is also the story of those that who are suddenly prohibited entry
by the Israeli Shin Bet and don’t understand why this is happening to them. Put yourself in
their place. You go out to work somewhere every day, for years, and suddenly they tell you
‘That’s it,’ although you’ve done nothing. (MachsomWatch, 2011a: 7, translation by
author)
The report details the various changes in the official procedures for appealing the denial
of Palestinian work permits. One day, the authority for appeals was a certain body, the
next day it became a different body; one day, the employers were granted exclusive
appeal powers, the next day the workers themselves could also appeal, but to a different
address; and, at certain intervals, no appeals were allowed. Specifically, from mid-2007
through September 2008 there was one address for appeals; between September and
December of that year this address became two; then in 2009 a wave of permit cancella-
tions ensued and a new category of prohibition was introduced: ‘debriefing’ (in Hebrew
tihkur). From June 2009 until April 2010 there was no process set in place for appeals.
During this period, an officer in the Population Registry department of the Military
Advocate General in Judea and Samaria responded to MachsomWatch’s inquiries:
Recently our office has been receiving on a weekly basis a large number of copies of
requests to revoke the ‘security prevention’ of residents whose request to enter Israel for
employment purposes was denied ... Our office is not the authorized administrative institu-
tion for handling such requests ... [and] complaints about the conduct of the Civil Admin-
istration. I ask that the sending of these copies be stopped. [They create] a burden on the fax
machine and also waste precious ecological resources. (Letter from November 9, 2009,
quoted in Hass, 2012)
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Until June 2007 this department was, in fact, the exclusive address for appealing against
the security prevention.
Then, for the year or so that followed, the workers were once again granted the right to
appeal. And, finally, from May through November 2011, MachsomWatch documented a
much more stringent application of the military orders by Israeli officials and the trans-
formation of Palestinian workers into ‘alien workers’ (in Hebrew poalim zarim). The
report also points out that the right to appeal the security prohibition has been granted
only to those requesting permanent entry permits to work in Israel. If one must enter
Israel periodically, for medical treatment for example, they have no right to appeal.
Longtime MachsomWatch activist Roni Hammerman describes this intensification of
bureaucratic control:
Israel’s control is becoming tighter and tighter. Nowadays, there are a hundred and one dif-
ferent permits that the Palestinians must acquire if they need to enter into Israel, and espe-
cially into East Jerusalem, where many of the Palestinians’ central institutions and hospitals
are located ... For example, just this year we realized that a special permit is required for
Palestinians to enter the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem during the Ramadan on Fridays,
and that a different permit is required for every day of the Ramadan. So if, by any chance, a
Palestinian must go to the hospital in East Jerusalem on a Friday – well, that’s absolutely out
of the question because on Fridays Israel grants limited entry only for holders of Friday
prayer permits. (Interview)
In addition to its operation through the physical site of the checkpoint, then, the occupa-
tion operates through an increasingly sophisticated bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is not
devised at the border; more probably, it emanates from the invisible and inaccessible
chambers of military bureaucrats. Resisting the occupation has therefore become much
more difficult. In order to maintain their effectiveness, MachsomWatch women have
altered their own technologies of resistance to the bureaucratization of the occupation.
Consequently, they have gradually shifted their focus from conducting daily observa-
tions in the physical sites of the checkpoints (aka terminals) into various forms of legal
and administrative resistance. In the words of journalist Amira Hass,
They began waiting for hours with the workers and tradesman who went to appeal the ‘secu-
rity prevention’ in the offices of the Coordination and Liaison Administration, and after-
wards they helped to fill out forms and submit requests to overturn the prevention. They
called everyone possible in the Civil Administration to find out why someone waits for
hours and never gets to the window of a clerk, why he is not given a receipt for submitting
the request, why a reply to a previous request doesn’t arrive, and why there are no forms in
Arabic. They wrote letters to the officer of the employment department in the Civil Admin-
istration, to the Military Advocate General in Judea and Samaria, to the head of the Shin Bet
and to the head of the Civil Administration. (Hass, 2012)
Through January 2012, MachsomWatch women have helped some 5000 Palestinians
through the legal process for appealing against Israel’s decision to refuse their work per-
mits.13 In the initial stage of handling these cases, the ‘security prohibition’ evaporated
for 35 percent of them. Some appeals then proceeded to judicial institutions, despite the
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financial outlay. Attorney Tamir Blank partnered with the women of MachsomWatch,
whose volunteer work has lowered the cost to the Palestinian worker. Of the 283 people
who turned to the courts via MachsomWatch, the security denial of about 70 percent eva-
porated, usually before the deliberations stage.
Clearly, the changes in the technologies of power operative at and around the border
have brought about corresponding changes in the technologies of resistance to such
power. In addition to devoting an internal committee to fighting the security prohibitions
issued by the Israeli Shin Bet, another MachsomWatch group has been documenting and
resisting the prohibitions put in place by the military police. Finally, MachsomWatch
women have been observing the military courts in which Palestinians from the West
Bank are tried. From the organization’s website:
We follow the progress of the hearings, starting with the detention of the suspects on
remand, up until and including the verdict and the sentence. These proceedings are the
‘daily bread of affliction’ of the Palestinians living in the occupied territories but are invi-
sible and unknown to the Israeli public. (MachsomWatch, 2012)
The new form of power executed at the Israeli/Palestinian border is different not only in
the bureaucratization and legalization of its elements, but also in the increasing mechan-
ization of the border and in the arbitrariness and alienation that have ensued, what I refer
to here as the de-humanization of the crossings.
De-Humanizing the Crossings
The first stage in the actual movement through the crossing is the queue. Whereas offi-
cially, the queue is not part of the crossing itself but a preliminary part thereof, it is a
critical stage in the Palestinian’s experience of the border. Many Palestinians secure their
position in line hours before the crossing is officially open, hoping to make it to work on
time. Under the old border regime, the queues and their management were left to Pales-
tinian responsibility. The Palestinians formed themselves into queues in open space.
Under the new regime, queues are constructed and enforced through metal fences that
funnel movement. Here from a description of the Qalandia Crossing by three Machsom-
Watch women:
Long lines extended into the sleeves [queuing channels] when we arrived at 6:05 a.m.
. . . [O]ne family (with an infant child, headed for the hospital) stood waiting by the
Humanitarian Gate. When we saw no sign of the staff in charge of opening the Gate,
we called the DCO and heard from a sleepy soldier, who declined to identify himself,
that the Gate would not be opened before 8 a.m. (whereas it usually operates until 8
a.m.). We asked that a sign at least be posted on the gate informing people to this effect
but saw no action in this direction during the half hour we were present. Soon after we
arrived, however, movement through the sleeves picked up pace, and the turnstiles
were opened every 8–10 minutes, with some 50 people (in total) going through each
time. (MachsomWatch, 2011c)
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During my 2008 visit to the Bethlehem crossing, Hanna Barag points to a special
queue designed for disabled people. It is almost always closed, she laments (Barag, inter-
view). Otherwise, Israel’s mechanically imposed queues are not designed to accommo-
date groups with special needs, parents with children, and women. In effect, the physical
design of the new crossings already excludes many Palestinians, especially traditional
Muslim women, who must refrain from direct physical contact with male strangers.
After the queue comes the turnstile. Rather than the old way of managing the Pales-
tinian queue – which usually involved an Israeli soldier shouting ‘wahad-wahad’ or
‘one-by-one’ – the turnstile now makes it physically impossible to move in any way
other than one-at-a-time and in any other direction but forward (Figure 7). This mechan-
ism is hardly new, nor is it by any means sophisticated. Barag refers to the metal queues
as ‘cattle paths’ and explains that they enable a strict control of movement by Israeli sol-
diers without necessitating any direct physical contact.
Barag points out that on top of the turnstiles there are two lights, green (go) and
red (no go). Simultaneously, she instructs me, the turnstile’s operation is controlled by
an Israeli guard, who is invisible to the passenger. Once the passenger is inside the turn-
stile he is locked in until the invisible operator lets him out. The physical design of go/no
go that supposedly enables Palestinian discretion, however limited, is thus unnecessary
and even misleading. The turnstile actually leaves no such discretion to its Palestinian
user who is instead entirely controlled by the panoptic gaze of the Israeli soldier. This
situation is exemplified in the following quote from the logbook of two MachsomWatch
women who visited the Anata crossing, which was under construction at the time. In
their words, ‘We first went to the northern entrance with the smaller checkpoint where
we saw no soldiers, but two new turnstiles near the main road, which were operated from
afar. The schoolgirls who entered pressed a button and the gates turned’ (Machsom-
Watch, 2011b).
Barag also points to the metal fences situated on the top of turnstiles to ensure that
Palestinians cannot cut the queue from above (Figure 7b). Just the other day, she tells
me, a Palestinian was crushed from the pressure of the crowd between the entrance to
the queue, on the one hand, and the turnstile, on the other hand, and as a result broke
Figure 7. Metal queues and turnstiles in Qalandia. Photos by author, August 2008.
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one of his ribs (Barag, interview). The physical technology of the turnstile, presented
by Israel as decreasing human friction and promoting orderliness, thus ends up increas-
ing other forms of friction and enhancing chaos. It does so, however, with no direct
involvement by border officials.
Whereas in the old border regime, personal encounters between Palestinians and
Israeli soldiers were frequent, the increasing implementation of nonhuman technologies
under the new regime results in much less human contact between Israelis and Palesti-
nians. The nonhuman fixtures used in the new crossings – signs, fences, bars, turnstiles
– distance their human imposers and render their effects an inevitable outcome of techni-
cal design (see also, albeit in a different context, Braverman, 2010). This new form of
inspection is sunk into the infrastructure of the border, and so it becomes embedded, stan-
dardized, routinized and thus transparent (Graham, 2008). As infrastructure, these tech-
nologies both fix and normalize the securitized modes of border operation. They also
severely restrict the power to resist. Roni Hammerman explains:
We have less and less power to change anything. We are pushed to the margins: here we’re
not allowed to enter, there it’s declared a closed military zone or Area A. So everything hap-
pens somewhere else, somewhere inside. And we are pushed further and further away from
that ‘inside.’ Once, we were able to stand near the soldiers and watch. Now, the most we can
do is pass through the terminals like the Palestinians – and this, too, we’re only allowed in a
small minority of the passages where the other side is not in Area A. But even as we do this,
the soldiers threaten us that if we don’t move along, they’ll stop checking Palestinians. By
the same token, once we could attend all the military court hearings we wanted. Now, they
hardly let anyone in, especially in Jerusalem. You need to send a fax on a specific date and
your name needs to be on an ancient list from God knows when. The direct connection with
the soldier – that has disappeared completely. There’s no more eye contact, which used to be
such an important part of our work. (Interview)
Turning from the role of nonhuman technologies in reducing friction to their pur-
ported role in reducing time, Colonel Tirza insists that the new crossings facilitate
swift and easy passage. In his words, ‘the intention isn’t to block passage but to let
people pass and to provide a level of service to the person who needs to cross’. ‘For
example’, he says:
I told the Court that in the checkpoints [that] I’m building in Jerusalem, anyone who doesn’t
fall into the profiling won’t wait for more than an hour and a half, even at the busiest times.
Today we’re at around 20 minutes – at busy times. (Tirza, interview)
By contrast, a short video produced by MachsomWatch recorded the Bethlehem crossing
at 4:30am. It shows that only four of 12 gates were operative at the time, which resulted
in a several hours-long queue outside the crossing (MachsomWatch, 2008). Here, in the
words of a Palestinian teacher:
My main problem is on the way home . . . The soldier[s] make the passengers get out. They
wait to be checked and then cross the checkpoint by foot. This takes lots of time, sometimes
a few hours, especially if there is security activity in the area or an alert. If the soldiers are
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eating lunch, the wait is even longer. They stop working and we stand there under the sun or
in the cold until they let us cross . . . I sometimes get home at 1:00 P.M., sometimes at 3:00,
and sometimes later. It’s impossible to predict. It is very frustrating. Also, my family never
knows whether to wait for me before eating. (B’Tselem, 2011b)
As in many other instances, it is hard to believe that the military officials and the human
rights activists are actually speaking about the same places.
The only consistent theme at the border is inconsistency. This inconsistency is yet
another form of arbitrariness: people never know what obstacles they will or will not
encounter when crossing the border.
June 3, 2011: Qalandia Crossing, Concluding Notes
The occupation of three years ago ... is not the occupation of today. The occupation has
undergone a process of professionalization, or I don’t know what to call it. Today the IDF
spokesperson will tell you that everything is much more humane and much more adapted.
No one stands in the rain anymore and God knows ... everything is in tip-top shape. (Hanna
Barag, interview)
Figure 8. Qalandia Crossing on Friday, June 3, 2011. Photo by author.
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In this essay, I have focused on the changes that have taken place at Israel’s border with
the occupied West Bank in the last decade or so, and especially since the construction of
the Separation Barrier. I have identified the many ways in which the administration of
this border has shifted from being ad hoc and transient to a fixed infrastructural construc-
tion. I have also pointed to the consolidation of the border and its mechanization, which
has created an intense network of identification and bureaucratic sophistication. These
have given birth to another source of confusion, another mode of alienation of the Pales-
tinian subject from that which was formerly produced by the face-to-face encounter that
characterized the old model. The old model, I should clarify, has not entirely disappeared
from this space. It has moved into the margin of Israel’s new border regime. Israel’s
rhetoric throughout this shift has been consumer-based and has highlighted efficiency
and globalization as its central themes. Accordingly, the new border vocabulary refers
to the checkpoints as international crossings and to the Palestinians as passengers. At the
same time, Israel’s neoliberal move is accompanied by a form of heightened securitiza-
tion (Braverman, 2011).
The myriad changes in the Israeli/Palestinian border’s physical space and in its mode
of human and nonhuman operations have engendered changes in the role of Machsom-
Watch in resisting the occupation. At the beginning, MachsomWatch consisted of a
small group of radical women outside of the consensus, who insisted on witnessing the
occupation as it happened in the everyday operation of the checkpoints and of Palestinian
life. Their resistance occurred at the physical sites of the occupation: in the places where
Palestinians and soldiers interacted. Many soldiers did not know about them then, and
incidents of tear gas, although infrequent, were part of the risk. This was in the old days.
Alongside the solidification and bureaucratization of the official Israeli border, Mach-
somWatch has, in many respects, solidified and bureaucratized right along with it. First
and foremost, the changes in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank have given rise to the
legalization of resistance by MachsomWatch. Today, MachsomWatch resists not only at
the space of the checkpoints or the terminals, but, and increasingly so, in court proceed-
ings and administrative sessions and in the offices of military and political officials. The
act of witnessing with one’s own eyes that so characterized MachsomWatch’s operations
in the old days required bodily presence at certain places in specific times; this act has
gradually transformed into administrative and legal networking, performed through fax
machines, official forms, legal documents, and exclusive meetings with high level mil-
itary officials. ‘The checkpoints are no longer the heart of this matter’, Hanna Arnon,
MachsomWatch activist since 2002, tells me along these lines. Although within her
group, she is responsible for writing the weekly reports of their visits to the Bethlehem
terminal, she has not written anything for months. ‘I don’t read the reports, either. They
just repeat themselves over and over again. So what’s the point in reporting?’ Conver-
sely, Arnon feels that she is making a difference in her relatively new role on the com-
mittee that challenges the prohibition status of Palestinians. ‘There, I feel like I can help’,
she says,
although I know that my influence is only a drop in the sea. And I certainly don’t feel like a
hero. It’s just that I survived World War II in Holland, where I was persecuted for being a
Jew, so I cannot be blind to what’s going on here. (Interview)
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Increasingly, MachsomWatch women also routinely meet with military commanders
and inform them of the checkpoints’ operations on the ground. Despite themselves, then,
they have become part of the system: an instrument for improving the system from
within and a way for Israel to legitimize its border operations to the outside world by
attending to the demands of human rights groups. In the words of Hanna Arnon:
Today the procedure is so extremely complicated that there is this feeling that all the efforts
that we underwent, everything we did through the years, just provided the Civil Adminis-
tration with more insight as to how to run the occupation more efficiently and how to make
things even more difficult to work around. They have become super-masters in control . . .
This has led many of us to feel guilty. Maybe if we had left the situation as it was, in its
primordial state, maybe if we didn’t fight so much and think so hard about how to overcome
the system – maybe then things wouldn’t have turned out so badly? (Interview)
The increasing realization of how resistance feeds into power and makes it yet more
effective has resulted in growing frustration among certain MachsomWatch members.
Here, from a routine report posted on the organization’s website:
What new things can we write in our weekly reports? Everything remains the same. ‘For the
sake of testimony,’ impels me and my companions on this shift. True, we are faithful wit-
nesses to this humiliation of human beings, to their harassment. We give people work per-
mits and then they are prevented from getting to work in a human, reasonable fashion; they
are crowded between fences for 2 hours . . . And what do we, MachsomWatch, do to help
them by standing there? Maybe by listening to their distress? I wish that were true. But the
truth is that our empathy does not bring them any income and does not compensate for the
daily humiliation that they experience. I wish that someone would finally do something to
bring back our long lost self-esteem. (MachsomWatch, 2012)14
Let me end this article with the words of Yehudit Keshet, one of the founders of Mach-
somWatch. She says: ‘The courteous relations between the army and Checkpoint Watch,
like so much else in the strange planet of Occupation, are ambivalent, with the potential
to neutralize our work’ (Keshet, 2007: 116).
Notes
1. Since 2005, possession of a magnetic ID card is a pre-Keshet requisite for Palestinian West
Bank and Gaza Strip identity card holders to receive a permit from the Israeli authorities to
enter East Jerusalem or Israel. OCHA, Special Report. Available at: http://www.ochaopt.
org/documents/opt_prot_plopmg_magn_Id_cards_sept_05.pdf (accessed 21 November
2011).
2. A Turkish beverage prepared from orchid tubers. It is milky white in appearance, with only a
slight flavor.
3. Quoting from the title of the webpage by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Around this title
are several dozen facial images of Israelis who, as the website implies, died in Palestinian ter-
rorist attacks.
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4. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saving Lives: Israel’s anti-terrorist fence – Answers to Ques-
tions. Available at: www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/11/SavingþLives-
þIsrael-sþanti-terroristþfenceþ-þAnsw.htm (accessed 1 November 2011).
5. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Anti-Terrorist Fence vs. Terrorism. Available at: http://
securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/Print.asp?DocumentID¼147298 (accessed 4 Febru-
ary 2012).
6. However, in addition to the abovementioned checkpoints, the Israeli army still erects hun-
dreds of surprise or flying checkpoints along West Bank roads. Human rights reports suggest
that the number of these has appreciably grown. From April 2009 to March 2010, the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) counted a monthly average
of 310 flying checkpoints, whereas from September 2008 to March 2009, the monthly aver-
age was 65. Finally, in September 2011, 522 roadblocks and checkpoints obstructed Pales-
tinian movement in the West Bank (not including flying checkpoints), compared to 503 in
July 2010. Until September 2011, an additional 495 ad hoc flying checkpoints obstructed
movement around the West Bank each month (on average), compared to 351 in the past two
years (OCHA, 2011).
7. These Palestinians are considered essential to Israeli economy. Such official numbers are
quoted, for example, by Ariel Handel (2010: 272). But there are indications that this number
is much higher than the actual permits granted. An official Israeli report indicates that since
2008 Israel has taken several measures to improve the economic situation in the West Bank.
As an example, it cited a recent increase in work permits to 26,000 permits and to 5,000 one-
time overnight permits (Koren, 2009).
8. The information in this paragraph is courtesy of Ariel Handel from the forthcoming 2012
B’Tselem report. MachsomWatch activist Nura Rash says about these latter structures: ‘These
spaces were left behind like haunted ghosts, hinting that they can always somehow come back
to life’ (February 6, 2012, personal communication).
9. Ariel Handel, from the forthcoming 2012 B’Tselem report.
10. Kamil Abu Rokon has since replaced Treiber. A Druze and formerly Head of the Civil Admin-
istration, Abu Rokon is ‘not just a better administrator, but also is much less cruel than his
predecessor: he really is trying to avoid unnecessary humiliation at the passages and wants
to see them becoming international border crossings like anywhere else. We work much more
closely with his administration than with the previous one’ (Hanna Barag, email communica-
tion, February 6, 2012).
11. Apparently, these numbers have not changed since then. Roni Hammerman of Machsom-
Watch notes accordingly that ‘In the last several years I haven’t seen much happening on the
privatization front. It seems like they are not sure this is working so they stopped moving in
that direction, at least for now’ (Interview).
12. See e.g. Qalandia Checkpoint, the second Friday of the Ramadan at: http://www.machsom-
watch.org/en/qualandia_checkpoint_second_friday_ramadan (last viewed November 6,
2011).
13. Of over 180,000 Palestinian residents of the occupied territories who have been prohibited
entry since the mid-2000s (MachsomWatch, 2011a: 14).
14. A powerful video filmed by Neta Efroni from MachsomWatch compares Qalandia in 2008
and in December 2011, speaking volumes about the frustration of Palestinians (and, indirectly,
the MachsomWatch women) with how things have remained the same at this checkpoint:
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼c4bDki45_Uc&feature¼youtu.be (accessed 7 February
2012).
Interviews
Shaul Arieli, Colonel (retired), former head of the Negotiating Administration in then-Prime Min-
ister Ehud Barak’s office and currently a member of the board of the Council for Peace and
Security, interview, Tel Aviv, August 12, 2008.
Hanna Arnon, activist, MachsomWatch, interview, Telephone, February 7, 2012.
Hanna Barag, activist, MachsomWatch, interview, Jerusalem, August 7, 2008; email communica-
tions, February 2012.
Hanna Barag, activist, MachsomWatch, participatory observation, Bethlehem Crossing, August
10, 2008.
Hanna Barag, activist, MachsomWatch, interview, Qalandia, June 3, 2011.
Yehudit Elkana, activist, MachsomWatch, interview, Jerusalem, August 3, 2008.
Roni, Hammerman, activist, MachsomWatch, interview, Telephone, February 8, 2012.
Micha, Head of Administration and Funding of the Passage Administration, interview by tele-
phone, September 11, 2008.
Ilan Paz, Brigadier General (retired), former Head of the Civil Administration in the West Bank,
interview, Tel Aviv, August 12, 2008.
Nura Rash, MachsomWatch, interview, telephone, February 7, 2012.
Danny Tirza, Colonel (retired), former Head of Security Fence Operations 1994–2007, interview,
Jerusalem, August 14, 2008.
Bezalel Treiber, current Head of Minhelet Ha’Maavarim or Crossing Directorate, interview by
telephone, September 18, 2008.
References
Abu-Zahra N (2007) IDs and territory: Population control for resource expropriation. In:
Cowen D and Gilbert E (eds) War, Citizenship, Territory. New York: Routledge, pp.
303–326.
B’Tselem (2011a) Checkpoints, physical obstructions and forbidden roads. The Israeli Informa-
tion Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. Available at: http://www.btselem.
org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads (accessed 4 November 2011).
B’Tselem (2011b) Testimony: Teacher from Jordan Valley tells of daily delays at checkpoints on
his way to and from school in Northern West Bank, April 2011. Available at: http://www.btse
lem.org/testimonies/testimony-teacher-jordan-valley-tells-daily-delays-checkpoint-his-way-
and-school-northern-
Braverman I (2010) Governing with clean hands: Automated public toilets and sanitary surveil-
lance. Surveillance & Society 8(1): 1–27.
Braverman I (2011) Civilized borders: A study of Israel’s new border regime. Antipode: A Radical
Journal of Geography 43(2): 264–295
Gordon N (2008) Israel’s Occupation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Graham S (2008) Sentient cities. Slideshare. Available at: www.slideshare.net/mobilecity2008/ste
phen-graham-sentient-cities (accessed 5 July 2009).
Gupta A and Ferguson J (1997) Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field
Science. Berkeley: University of California Press.
318 Social & Legal Studies 21(3)
Handel A (2007) Controlling the space through the space: Uncertainty as a technology of control.
Theory and Criticism 31: 101–126 (Hebrew).
Handel A (2010) Exclusionary surveillance and spatial uncertainty in the occupied Palestinian
territories. In: Abu-Laban Y, Lyon D and Zureik E (eds) Surveillance and Control in Israel/
Palestine. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.259–275.
Hass A (2012) Does helping Palestinians beautify the occupation? Haaretz, 30 January.
Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/does-helping-palestinians-beau
tify-the-occupation-1.409946
Heyman J (1995) Putting power in the anthropology of bureaucracy. Current Anthropology 36(2):
261–287.
Kelly T (2006) Documented lives: Fear and the uncertainties of law during the second Palestinian
intifada. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 11(1): 89–107.
Kelly T (2008) The attractions of accountancy: Living an ordinary life during the second
Palestinian intifada. Ethnography 9(3): 351–376.
Keshet YK (2007) Checkpoint Watch: Testimonies from Occupied Palestine. London: Zed
Books.
Koren O (2009) Israeli Foreign Affairs report the strengthening of the Palestinian economy.
Haaretz, 21 September 2009 (Hebrew).
MachsomWatch (2001) MachsomWatch website. Available at: www.machsomwatch.org/en
(accessed 6 November 2011).
MachsomWatch (2008) Morning at the Palestinian side of Bethlehem checkpoint (documenting
Bethlehem crossing on January 3, 2008). Available at: http://www.machsomwatch.org/en/
morning_palestinian_side_bethlehem_checkpoint
MachsomWatch (2011a) Invisible Prisoners: Don’t Know Why and There’s Nowhere to Turn,
June 2007–September 2011. Report (Jerusalem). Available at: http://www.machsomwatch.
org/sites/default/files/InvisiblePrisoners3.pdf [Hebrew]
MachsomWatch (2011b) Anata, Abu Dis, Thu February 10, 2011, afternoon. Available at: http://
www.machsomwatch.org/en/reports/checkpoints/10/02/2011/afternoon/17218 (accessed 4
November 2011).
MachsomWatch (2011c) Anata, Qalandiya, Tues 14.6.11, morning. Available at: http://www.
machsomwatch.org/en/reports/checkpoints/14/06/2011/morning/18168
MachsomWatch (2012) Qalandiya, Sun 29.1.12, morning, reporter H Pnina. Available at: http://www.
machsomwatch.org/en/reports/checkpoints/29/01/2012/morning/20088 [English translation];
http://www.machsomwatch.org/reports/checkpoints/29/01/2012/morning/19984?checkpoint¼ 296
[Hebrew] (accessed 7 February 2012).
Maoz E (n.d.) The privatization of the checkpoints and the late occupation. Who Profits. Available at:
http://www.whoprofits.org/content/privatization-checkpoints-and-late-occupation-eilat-maoz%
EF%BB%BF (accessed 6 November 2011).
Ministry of Defense – Israel Security Fence (2003) Available at: http://seamzone.mod.gov.il/
Pages/ENG/default.htm (accessed 4 November 2011).
Ministry of Defense Press Release (2006) January 15. Available at: www.mod.gov.il/WordFiles/
n32301062.doc (accessed 4 November 2011).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) Available at: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/
2003/11/SavingþLives-þIsrael-sþanti-terroristþfenceþ-þAnsw.htm (accessed 4 February
2012).
Braverman 319
OCHA (2011) Occupied Palestinian territory: Movement and access in the West Bank. Fact Sheet,
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, September.
Tal U (2006) Border Passages to Israel from the West Bank and Gaza. Report submitted to the
Knesset’s Committee of the Interior and Environment, 19 June [Hebrew].
Weizman E (2007) Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. New York: Verso.
320 Social & Legal Studies 21(3)
